IN the week that marks the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Belfast Agreement it seems somehow appropriate, albeit coincidental, that I should have just finished reading a history of the Treaties of Vienna and Versailles.
Vienna ( 1814) was an effort to bring some sense and shape to a Europe that had been regarded as Napoleon's plaything; while Versailles ( 1919) was a similar effort to sort out the world after the horrors of 19141918. As we now know, both treaties (
and the raft of pacts, subtreaties and arrangements that accompanied them) failed to address key problems and Europe and the wider world continued to favour armed conflict rather than negotiation as a means of tackling geographical and political disputes.
Indeed, the general history of treaties created to resolve disputes is not a happy one; with most of them either collapsing immediately or being twisted and bent to the point of destruction over a number of years. ' Problem' The BritishIrish " problem" predated the Concert of Europe negotiations of 1814 and the problem remained unresolved while two world wars came and went; while a cold war came and went; while a battlescarred Europe remodelled itself into the European Union; while the Berlin wall came and went; while Nelson Mandela went from terrorist to revered statesman; and while generations of British Prime Ministers tried to resolve it to the satisfaction of both sides.
In other words, the Belfast Agreement was a very, very long time in the making! Other efforts, including the original Act of Union, the 1920 Act, the Irish Constitution, the 1949 Act, Sunningdale Agreement ( 1973) and the AngloIrish Agreement of 1985 have now turned to dust or been substantially rewritten. The Agreement itself was altered during interparty negotiations between 1999 and 2003 and the DUP would claim that it was " significantly improved" as a consequence of its efforts at St Andrews in October 2006.
The departed Tony Blair and the soon to depart Ian Paisley and Bertie Ahern none of whom has their problems to seek in terms of the ultimate judgment of history have all basked in the warm glow of approval that greeted both the original 1998 deal and Ian Paisley's 2007 version. David Trimble and John Hume have been heaped with honours.
The increasingly desperate Hillary Clinton has claimed credit. Gerry Adams ( although he is now in real danger of drowning in his own piety and A Nation Once Again delusion) tours the world as a born again peacemaker. And in the next few weeks a veritable army of bit players and mere observers will be lining up to insist that they, too, had a part to play.
When Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Tse Tung was asked, in the 1960s, to discuss the long term consequences of the French Revolution, he replied: " It's too early to tell, yet." So, in response to the News Letter's Big Question this week, " Was the Good Friday Agreement positive for Northern Ireland?" My answer is it's too early to tell, yet.
While it is true that the absence of a terrorist campaign by the IRA is a positive development, it is marred by the fact that Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams continue to tell their own grassroots that the united Ireland project is still ongoing. Of course, having bought into an internal settlement, a return to Stormont and a unionist First Minister, it is hardly surprising that IRA figureheads would feel the need to insist that the Agreement is a mere transition stage to the ultimate goal. New generation The problem, of course, is that even at this early stage a new generation of young republicans probably regard McGuinness and Adams as traitors to the cause. And as more and more evidence emerges of how deeply and completely the IRA had been penetrated by British security, that new generation will come to believe that it is their duty to relight the torch and kickstart the struggle. Tie that development in with a Fianna Fail/ SDLP pact or merger further down the line and you will quickly have a background in which unionists, once again, will believe that they have something to fear from a panrepublican front. On the unionist side we already have evidence that the DUP is promoting their version of the Agreement as the triumph of " confident unionism" over a Sinn Fein/ IRA that has been brought to heel by the resolution and negotiating skills of Peter Robinson et al. The difficulty is that the Jim Allister wing of unionism doesn't believe that spin; while Sinn Fein will become increasingly concerned that the DUP really does believe it! And if the DUP chooses to counter the Allister blasts by beefing up its own antiSinn Fein rhetoric, and Sinn Fein, in turn, feels the need to flex its own veto muscle, then it really is very hard to see how genuine powersharing and mutually beneficial cooperation can be encouraged. The Belfast Agreement can only truly flourish if both communities feel that they can share Northern Ireland. It cannot flourish if the DUP and Sinn Fein have entirely contradictory interpretations of what the Agreement stands for and if both pursue an agenda aimed at excluding or sidelining the other as much as is possible. Putting it bluntly, if unionists regard the Agreement as the best means of protecting their own interests, while nationalists/ republicans regard it as the best means of promoting eventual unity, then it is inevitable that the Agreement will collapse under the strain of competing and contradictory demands and expectations. Survival Its survival will depend on how many people honestly regard it as a vehicle for greater cooperation between the power blocs. And we may not know the answer to that question until we see what the next generation of MLAs looks like. There isn't a unionist or republican MLA from the present crop who can, with any degree of conviction, offer the sort of leadership required if this Agreement is to survive. What we need now is people with a vision which extends beyond small party mindsets and embraces a genuinely new dispensation for Northern Ireland. Our future really does depend on the emergence of a new generation of political thinkers and representatives. And that, in turn, depends on the wider electorate being prepared to take a chance and demanding more from local politicians. If not, then the Agreement will join a very long line of landmark deals that are remembered for all the wrong reasons.
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