IF there is to be a credible alternative to what is beginning to look like the prospect of a permanent Sinn Fein/unionist party axis at the heart of government (or, worse still, Sinn Fein as the largest party and three unionist parties fighting it out with each other for the post of Deputy First Minister), then it lies in the electoral recovery of the SDLP.
Because if Sinn Fein continues on its present course – which consists of nothing more subtle than threatening the collapse of the Executive if it doesn't get its own way - then the stalemate which characterises the relationship it has with the DUP wi
ll continue, irrespective of which of the unionist parties has most seats.
Peter Robinson talks of a change in the Assembly's voting system as a way of counterbalancing the Sinn Fein veto; but since such a change would require Sinn Fein's support, it isn't going to happen. Meanwhile, Jim Allister is cooking up plans to exclude Sinn Fein from the Executive Committee altogether; but Jim knows that that won't happen, either. So even if the TUV wins enough seats to play the unionist kingmaker in the next Assembly (and I reckon they could take somewhere between 12 and 16 seats) that, in itself, does not guarantee the exclusion of Sinn Fein.
And even a UUP/TUV/DUP/Conservative/PUP electoral pact which could, possibly, add an extra six seats to the unionist tally, wouldn't solve the problem. Because if Sinn Fein retained its status as the larger of the nationalist parties, and held on to the post of Deputy First Minister and the mutual veto, then it still has the power to stymie everything it doesn't like.
So the only way around the problem is for the SDLP to start winning back votes and seats and re-emerging as the majority voice of nationalism again: which is why the choice of successor to Mark Durkan is of vital importance to unionism. That said, the relationship between the SDLP and unionism hasn't been great over the years; and from my perspective John Hume was the key factor in the failure of the UUP (in particular) and the SDLP to reach consensus at a much earlier stage.
He had no understanding of what made unionism tick and he didn't actually care, either. All that mattered to him was his precious "agreed Ireland", with his definition of agreed being that the British, Irish, American and EU governments have agreed that Ireland should be united as quickly as possible and that all initiatives and processes should be predicated on that assumption.
He preferred helping and rehabilitating Sinn Fein, and encouraging a pan-nationalist philosophy, rather than building a unionist/nationalist structure which might have given Jim Molyneaux the confidence and courage to coax his party into a post-Sunningdale agreement in the early 1980s. And, of course, he was the architect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which came pretty damn close to destroying for ever any chance of a unionist/nationalist relationship. No-one will convince me that such an outcome wouldn't have been welcome to him.
Seamus Mallon didn't help matters much when he told everyone who would listen that the Belfast Agreement was "Sunningdale for slow learners". That statement was as inaccurate as it was offensive. The IRA wasn't buying into Sunningdale. The SDLP gave Faulkner no leeway on the Council of Ireland.
