During the course of the last week a number of people have trotted out the 'united we stand, divided we fall' mantra and blamed division on the presence of too many parties. But there's no point blaming the parties: it is voters, after all, who give them support. Jim Allister is where he is today because 66,197 people gave him their first preference. The DUP was once little more than a fringe group. And along the way we have had Vanguard, the United Ulster Unionist Movement, the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom Unionist Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, the Ulster Democratic Party and even the Conservatives from 1992 onwards. On June 4 the 'Ulster Conservatives and Unionists' entered the fray.

The common bond between those who describe themselves as unionists is the belief that Northern Ireland remains within the United Kingdom. The difficulties and divisions arise because they found, and still find it extraordinarily hard to agree amongst themselves how best to promote their belief. Yet one thing has been a fixed certainty: after the collapse of majority rule in 1972, the price for restored devolution (as set out in a Green Paper in the autumn of that year) was power-sharing with nationalists and an in-built 'Irish dimension.' That was the core element of Sunningdale in 1974 and the core element of the Belfast and St Andrews Agreements in 1998 and 2006.

The majority of unionism opposed mandatory coalition in 1974 and a very significant, albeit growing minority of unionism opposes it still. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985, when the British and Irish governments proved their determination to cut their own deal, a section of unionism turned to integration as a way of bypassing the power-sharing elements of devolution. But it was never a serious starter, if only because no British government or national political party was ever going to agree a settlement which lacked the support of Dublin and excluded the nationalist minority.

And that was the other problem for unionism, because even with its' electoral and political majority in Northern Ireland no unionist party, individually or in coalition with other unionist parties, could deliver anything which lacked the imprimatur of Westminster.

Where we are today represents a stalemate of sorts, but only of sorts. None of the three unionist blocs is opposed to the Belfast/St Andrews Agreement per se, but there are still disagreements about the outworkings of the process. The TUV is fundamentally opposed to mandatory coalition; but like the UUP and DUP before it, doesn't seem to have a rock-solid strategy for getting rid of it. I heard Jim Allister say on 'Hearts and Minds' that the unionist parties should go to a 'weakened' Gordon Brown and demand its' removal. Frankly Jim that is never going to happen—Brown has enough problems! And nor would it happen if the next General Election resulted in a hung Parliament with either Brown or Cameron dependent on unionist MPs of one hue or another.

The DUP believed that it had 'restored confidence' to unionism and outfoxed Sinn Fein; and because it believed that, it was able to live within the parameters of mandatory coalition, whilst making the occasional noises about preferring the voluntary option. But the truth, of course, is that the DUP and Sinn Fein negotiated and agreed a voluntary coalition in May 2007, complete with mutual veto and co-equality between the First and Deputy First Ministers. It was that coalition which the electorate was judging on June 4 and that judgment, more than anything else I suspect, explains the collapse of the DUP's vote. And, as I wrote the week before the election, "a bad result for the DUP will, fundamentally and immediately, alter the nature of the relationship and arrangements between the DUP and Sinn Fein".

The UUP and Conservatives argue that the St Andrews Agreement is immeasurably worse than the 1998 original; that the DUP has u-turned on just about everything; and that the form of devolution practised, primarily by the DUP and Sinn Fein, isn't making the difference for Northern Ireland that it should be making. But again, like the DUP and TUV, the UUP/Conservatives will find it enormously difficult to make the necessary changes without the direct support of Sinn Fein or a willingness of a British government to face down Sinn Fein objections and legislate anyway.

All of which begs the question of what happens next? Allister will be kingmaker in a number of seats and his votes could cause the DUP to lose to either the UUP or TUV. In a number of other seats (East Belfast and North Down particularly) a three or four way split within unionism could allow Alliance to slip through. And in some other seats a further split within unionism will simply see the nationalists/republicans adding to their tally.

In the forthcoming General Election the DUP and UUP/Conservatives have said they will be contesting every seat. The TUV will probably choose to stand in about six. And I wouldn't rule out the possibility of two or three 'independent unionists' as well. In other words, it's a potentially very messy and divisive situation, unappealing to regular voters and unattractive to non-voters.

The three main unionist blocs will all take some comfort from June 4 and insist they will continue to 'allow the electorate to decide'. The would-be independents will say that they have a case to make too and will allow the voters to 'make a judgment' on their stand and record. Put bluntly, the next two or three elections have all the makings of the free-for-all within unionism, which, as the evidence so clearly demonstrates, does nothing more than increase the numbers who don't bother voting any more.

It isn't demography or a superiority of nationalist/republican strategy which is undermining unionism. It is the ongoing inability of unionist parties, opinion formers, strategists and voters to build consensus around a platform which maximises turnout and maximises seats. That will require intra-party talks and an honest broker: and maybe it's something that the News Letter itself could facilitate.