Irish unity does not seem to be a key issue for many small '˜n' nationalists

Some unionists – OK, I do mean the DUP – have got themselves terribly excited, trying to market it as some sort of stunning victory for their own tactics and policies. Yet, while there is some evidence to suggest they may have picked up votes from Catholics more in tune with their stance on abortion and same-sex-marriage, the numbers involved are small and certainly shouldn’t be regarded as bankable DUP voters.

It’s pretty clear why the SDLP did badly: their campaign was the electoral equivalent of Twister. It would have been easier to learn braille in three weeks than to make sense of their manifesto.

There were moments when Colum Eastwood looked and sounded like the Bruce Willis character in The Sixth Sense; totally unaware that he was being ignored by everyone around him, because he had already snuffed it and was hovering in a limbo world between death and the afterlife.

Sinn Fein, meanwhile, lost 11,439 votes and a seat; leaving them 36,000 votes and 10 seats behind the DUP. At the 1998 Assembly election they were a mere 3,000 votes and two seats behind them.

So for all of Sinn Fein’s relentless boasting about their success and progress, the fact remains that they aren’t winning the electoral battle that really matters. It would now take an implosion of the DUP, combined with a resurrectionist swing towards half a dozen smaller parties, to enable Sinn Fein to take the top dog position in the Assembly – and that’s not happening anytime soon. It’s worth remembering that in 1998 the SDLP was the largest party in terms of overall votes, almost 6,000 ahead of the UUP.

If the SDLP and Sinn Fein believed that a power-sharing Assembly was the best tactical route for delivering a united Ireland – and that’s what Adams and Hume believed in that 1992/1998 period – then it’s now clear that something has gone wrong. There’s very little evidence to suggest that a closing of the demographic gap between Catholics/Protestants has boosted support for Irish unity; and the electoral evidence from the five Assembly elections further suggests that nationalism/republicanism is failing to get the necessary traction there, either.

A few days ago I spoke to someone who has been a Sinn Fein supporter for over 30 years. His response to my question about the election results was very instructive: “It’s hard to continue growing the electoral base when the chance of unity seems more remote than ever.”

In other words, if you were someone who voted for Sinn Fein or the SDLP because Irish unity was your political/emotional priority, why bother now?

The chances of unity have shrunk. The British/Irish relationship is better than it has been for over a century. The Irish political establishment has no particular interest in unity. The conditions required for a border poll are nowhere close to being met. Most of the other big ‘issues’ that dominated the nationalist agenda from 1963-1998 have been resolved and agitation for more is limited. In real terms the only big thing left is unity itself, yet it’s an issue that doesn’t seem to be a key one for an increasing number of small ‘n’ nationalists.

All of which may explain the ongoing threats from dissident republicanism. Their view is that Sinn Fein has nothing to show for their efforts since 1970. Indeed, many of those dissidents believe that PIRA was infiltrated, turned-over, emasculated and destroyed by the ‘Brits’; and that the present situation – PIRA silenced, Sinn Fein helping to govern Northern Ireland within the UK and the nationalist vote slipping – is exactly what the ‘Brits’ always wanted.

They view Sinn Fein as the real ‘dissidents,’ because they believe that Sinn Fein has been sold a Union Jack pup.

A few days ago Theresa May, the Home Secretary, confirmed that the official level of attacks in Britain from Irish republican dissidents has been raised from moderate to substantial: “a terrorist attack is a strong possibility and reflects the continuing threat from dissident republican activity.”

The threat level to the UK from international terrorists, particularly Islamic State, remains unchanged at the higher level of ‘severe,’ which means an attack is highly likely. The threat level in Northern Ireland from NI-related terrorism also remains unchanged at ‘severe.’

I don’t know what manpower, armoury, support or skills underpin republican terrorism. But if it is rising – as it surely will if increasing numbers of Sinn Fein’s more militant-minded base don’t see hard evidence of progress to unity – then it means problems. Problems for the British in terms of security and possible boots on the ground; problems for the Assembly and political stability; problems for Sinn Fein and their leadership strategy; problems for nationalism generally; problems for unionism, with the likelihood of loyalist retaliation and new, hardline voices emerging within the DUP and elsewhere; and problems for the British/Irish, Dublin/Belfast relationships.

If Irish unity is to happen it will not be through the thud of Semtex or the ‘expertise’ of a sniper. It will happen, if it happens, when circumstances and mindsets have aligned.

In the meantime the DUP and Sinn Fein need to prove that they can, at the very least, provide effective, consensual, successful government in the country for which they are now jointly responsible.

And that’s also the best way of destabilising and demoralising the ‘dissidents.’