Re-birth is probably too dramatic a term to use; nonetheless, in terms of his own survival as leader and in terms of the electoral prospects for his party, it is essential that the whole process is completed without any major hiccoughs.

The underlying problem for the UUP, a problem which has dogged it since its very beginnings in 1905, is that it was never really a political party in the ordinarily recognised sense of that word. It didn't bring together supporters from a particular class or socio-economic background and it didn't promote a particular platform to appeal to one section of its core vote rather than another.

Instead, it rallied people around the flag. The original Ulster Unionist Council gathered together all of the pro-Union vote, deploying a sheer mass of numbers to indicate that they would not easily be bundled out of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and into a newly independent Ireland. A number of lessons were learned from the experience of the Home Rule crises between 1885 and 1921 and many of them remained ingrained within the unionist psyche until quite recently.

Among them: Westminster, irrespective of which party formed the government, couldn't be relied upon to uphold, let alone promote, the interests of Ulster unionists. Nationalists weren't to be trusted. All Roman Catholics were republicans at heart. Unionist unity was the only way of securing the Union. And, to ensure some sort of parity with the rest of the United Kingdom (as well as preventing unfriendly governments from pointing out differences), Stormont would adopt and adapt---often wholesale---most socio-economic legislation emanating from Westminster.

The net result of this was that the Ulster Unionist Party, more or less from 1921 to 1972, remained a monolithic power bloc which refused to change, reach out, reform internally, attract non-Protestants or develop its own socio-economic agenda. And when it began to fracture, from 1969 onwards, it was always on the issue of the split between the "not an inch" diehards and the pragmatists who believed that survival depended upon flexibility.

What the UUP has faced for almost forty years has been a series of splits and factionalism, along with an internal wrestling for the "soul" of the party. The Alliance Party and DUP took most of their votes from the UUP. The local Conservatives took smaller numbers. Along the way Vanguard, the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (Faulkner's party), the UKUP and various mavericks and independents took their chunks of votes as well. And let's not forget the former voters who just got tired of the squabbling and stayed at home.

And during all of this time, while new pro-Union parties formed and created their own tight structures and rules, the UUP continued to be little more than a catch-all name for a group of semi-autonomous constituency associations and affiliated bodies. No-one was ever entirely sure where power lay in the party, a weakness which was exploited to the advantage of those who wanted to undermine policy or embarrass the leader. And because of the "broad-church-entitled-to-your-opinion" culture, which was another hallmark of the UUP, discipline was almost non-existent.

Finally, though, the worse than expected results of the 2005 and 2007 elections made it apparent to everyone in the UUP that they really did have to change the way they did things. Put bluntly, the party wasn't functioning effectively at constituency, communications or headquarters level. Yes, policy may have had some effect on their decreasing vote, but since the DUP were also now pro-Agreement and promising a fairer deal rather than an entirely new arrangement, it was clear that it wasn't just broad policy which was losing the UUP its vote.

Again, bluntly speaking, the party no longer looked like a serious, coherent, competent political machine. For a start, most of the candidates were male and middle-aged and many, for good reason, seemed uncertain of their core message.

The UUP has now come to the end of an extensive and very wide-ranging consultation exercise. Every single aspect of how the party functions and runs its affairs have been held up to scrutiny. And in key areas, like finance, communications, constituency organisation, candidate selection and the cumbersome constitution, major changes are being recommended. Admittedly, only the most wide-eyed of optimists would believe that endorsing the changes will result in an immediate turnaround of fortunes: but rejecting them, or passing them with a bare majority, will firmly and finally consign the party to oblivion.

Root and branch reform of the Ulster Unionist Party is something that has been required for decades. If the party is to punch its electoral and political weight then it has to be a streamlined, smartly run, coherent, campaigning and forward thinking entity. It has to prove that there is a continuing role for it. It has to establish a clear and attractive identity for itself. It has to act in such a way that both voters and the media sit up and take notice of it again.

The UUP has had a dreadful time over the past few years and there have been many media pundits and political opponents keen to pen an obituary. There will be no phoenix-like rising from the ashes next Friday night; but there is an opportunity for the party to gather itself together, face up to reality and take the first major steps upon the road to recovery.

The DUP has proved that it isn't as good in government as it promised it would be. Events have proved that the UUP embarked upon the right course in 1995. There is a pro-Union vote out there which is looking for a moderate, thoughtful party to play a significant role in either government or opposition. The UUP still has a role and a purpose. Next weekend, at its UUC meeting and annual conference, it must prove to itself, and to the electorate, that it recognises that purpose and is fully prepared for that role.