Yes, he may be a very capable administrator and a brilliant election strategist (although he was helped immeasurably by the fact that the UUP had enormous problems getting its act together for so long).

Yes, he has built a pretty competent team around him and promoted young talent through the ranks and into the Assembly. Yes, he has been a loyal and dedicated frontman for his party.

The problem, as I see it, is that he has been the understudy for far too long. He has perched on Dr Paisley's shoulder since the end of the 1970s. He is to Paisley what Brown was to Blair.

And that makes it impossible for him to pretend to be something different or offer something new. Let's face it, Robinson's supporters may be briefing the media that he will have an entirely different relationship with Martin McGuinness if he becomes First Minister, but Robinson did nothing to stop the damage that was being done to the DUP by the Chuckle Brothers imagery since last May.

His supporters say that he will be offering olive branches to the UUP and making soothing noises about re-building cooperation within unionism.

But it was Robinson who orchestrated most of the anti-UUP material which flowed from DUP headquarters over the years.

Dr Paisley may have had the better turn of phrase, but it was Robinson who often contributed the most bitter of the put-downs to the UUP.

Responsible

The other drawback with Robinson has been his serial failure to stand up to Paisley. He has been a pragmatist for an incredibly long time. He sat down with Frank Millar and Harold McCusker in the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement and prepared the Task Force Report in 1987.

It was a well thought out piece and made clear to both Paisley and UUP leader, Jim Molyneaux, that unionism was going to have to rethink its strategy and make unpleasant decisions. Both leaders rejected it and Robinson resigned as deputy leader. But he toed the line and came back to the job a few months later.


He also recognised, and quickly, that the Belfast Agreement was the only show in town. It was he who was mostly responsible for the rotating ministries response to the UUP's decision to take a leap of faith in November 1999. Again, he was the prime mover behind the Comprehensive Agreement process in 2004/5 and the St Andrews deal in 2006/7.

If ever there was a moment for genuine cooperation between the pragmatists of the UUP and DUP, it was during the 1997-2003 period. But Robinson preferred to continue with the attacks on Trimble, while insisting that the DUP was after a better deal.

I remember writing a piece in January 2000 in which I argued that the DUP (having taken its Executive Committee seats and joined the Assembly committees) would have nowhere else to go: "They are stuck with the Belfast Agreement. They may get an opportunity to tinker around the edges during later reviews, but the reality remains that the DUP are now pro-Agreement. And they are pro-Agreement because Peter Robinson has made them a pro-Agreement party."

All of which explains why the DUP had to spend the next seven years glued to a strategy of working towards the better deal. But it doesn't explain why the DUP failed to either get, or even bother negotiating the better deal when it arrived in St Andrews in October 2006.

As I see it they buckled under the pressure, rolled over and backtracked on just about every previous policy and pledge. And again, it was Peter Robinson who was at the forefront of pushing that deal.

Predicament

If the DUP now has huge internal problems-– which it clearly has – then Peter Robinson cannot excuse himself from the blame. If the electorate has begun to suspect that the DUP took a pretty disingenuous attitude after March 2007, then Peter Robinson cannot excuse himself from the blame. If the TUV is beginning to eat into the DUP's core vote, then Peter Robinson cannot excuse himself from the blame.

In other words, a very substantial responsibility for the DUP's present predicaments can be laid at Peter Robinson's doorstep.

I also find it extraordinary that the DUP could decide to ditch Paisley (and ditching him is exactly what they are doing) and then replace him with a vote which doesn't go beyond their Assembly group, many of whom owe their seats to Peter Robinson's support. This isn't just about electing a new leader.

It's the first leadership election the DUP has had since 1971. It's an election for the post of First Minister. It's an election about the direction the largest unionist party will take in the post-Paisley era. Surely the choice should be made by the DUP's wider membership?

Alternative

And surely there is someone within the ranks of their MLAs and MPs who could present themselves as the genuine face and voice of the post-Paisley DUP? Peter Robinson can never be that face or voice, because Peter Robinson is just Ian Paisley writ small.

And in exactly the same way that Gordon Brown is now haunted by the ghost of Tony Blair, Peter Robinson will be haunted by Ian Paisley. Change could be good for the DUP, but Peter Robinson cannot provide that change because Peter Robinson has controlled the levers and pulled the strings for so long. Peter represents the same-old, same-old.


Worst of all, though, its beginning to look like an internal stitch-up. A deal has already been done to remove and replace Paisley. Is Robinson now preparing another deal in which he, in turn, will pass on the mantle to a new deputy leader?

The DUP has had enough problems with family dynasties and whiffs of cronyism without adding to it with a leadership handover process which is limited to a very tight circle.

Wasn't there a reason, way back in 1971, that Ian Paisley decided to use the word democratic to describe his new party? The DUP has already upset many of its members by its actions since last March.

It will upset a great many more if it now decides that leadership is in the gift of a self-styled elite rather than in the hands of their long-time foot soldiers. Coronations rarely turn out well for political parties and I can see no evidence for the DUP being an exception to that rule.