Unionism was, in constitutional terms at least, in a stronger position than ever before. Strong enough, in fact, to refashion its public image and reach out beyond traditional parameters.

In November 1951, a few days after the Conservatives won their first post World War Two general election, Viscount Brookeborough spoke of the need for the Unionist Party to reform itself to "reflect the new realities and needs of a changed and changing world". But apart from some internal tinkering with the party's structures he did nothing. Terence O'Neill was forced into reform by external pressures, but never managed to reform the party itself. In the autobiographical Memoirs of a Statesman, Brian Faulkner commented on the difficulties of leading a body as dysfunctional as the Unionist Party and regretted the fact that he hadn't been able to reform it.

Between 1949 and 1969 there were opportunities for the Unionist Party to emerge as a less buttoned-up, more pluralist-minded party. It missed every one of those opportunities. And even in the short period between 1969 and the eventual prorogation of the Northern Ireland Parliament in March 1972, there were moments which could have been better handled by the party leadership.

I know that it is fashionable to say that Sunningdale was the biggest missed opportunity, but that is not true. Unionists were still in a state of shock that the constitutional guarantee written into the 1949 Act had been torn up. The newly formed Provisional IRA had given no indication that Sunningdale was acceptable to them. And the SDLP's insistence upon forcing a Council of Ireland down Faulkner's throat made his position untenable within his own party. (And let's not forget that the Executive Committee of the party and the Ulster Unionist Council had both, albeit by slim majorities, endorsed power-sharing in the autumn of 1973.)

Survival

After the overthrow of Faulkner in January 1974 and the later collapse of the United Ulster Unionist Coalition in 1977, the primary task of the UUP – still the largest party in Northern Ireland – was survival. It had opponents on the right in the shape of the DUP and opponents on the left in the shape of the Alliance Party. And, as ever, it had its own internal wrangles between the pragmatists and the hardline traditionalists. But as early as the Euro election in 1979 – when Paisley topped the poll – and the local government elections in 1981, when the DUP eclipsed them by one per cent, it was clear that the UUP's task was an enormous one.

Just before his 1981 party conference, UUP leader Jim Molyneaux had this response: "If we want to resist and rise above the challenge to us from the DUP, as witnessed in Dr Paisley's personal mandate two years ago and his party's success four months ago, then we must reassess every facet of our structures and overhaul every aspect of our operations."

Unprepared

The reality, of course, is that Mr Molyneaux didn't do that.