Declassified files: Insider’s account of day talks which led to 1998 Belfast Agreement almost fell apart

The eight-page memo circulated to Downing Street, the Cabinet Office, the British Embassy in Dublin and senior NIO officials sets out in detail how the government had all but accepted that the talks were going to collapse before having even properly begun only for UUP leader David Trimble to stun officials by entering direct negotiations with the Irish government and striking a deal.

Martin Howard, private secretary to secretary of state Sir Patrick Mayhew and the author of the memo, said that Mr Trimble exhibited “huge enjoyment” at being involved in the negotiations and appeared to him to therefore be reluctant to walk away.

Mr Howard, who is now assistant secretary general for operations at Nato, said in the June 13, 1996 memo that it had been “by any standards, an extraordinary day and a half”.

The process began at 2pm on June 10 with the parties assembled together. He said: “The Prime Minister’s speech was heard in respectful silence but the Taoiseach’s speech was marred by some ill-mannered sighs, groans and chattering from unionist delegrations which degenerated at the end into actual interruptions.”

Unionists objected to the proceedings being jointly chaired by the British and Irish governments, with an eventual acceptance by Dublin that the secretary of state would act as interim chairman until a decision on a permanent chair.

“The SDLP were in grim mood and determined to press for George Mitchell for chairman on the basis of an unchanged agenda and procedural guidelines.”

The DUP and UKUP were strongly opposed to Mitchell on two grounds. First, they did not agree with the role he would enjoy and the powers that went with it.

“Second, and more crucial in their view, was the fact that he was fatally compromised in unionist eyes because of his background and the way that his appointment had been acclaimed by the Irish government and Sinn Fein.

“At this stage the mood of McCartney and Paisley was friendly, jolly and courteous, a condition which did not last.

“The UUP had objections to Mitchell which were similar, but in their case the powers and procedures that he would operate under were much more prevalent than their reservations about his backgrounds, which had, to a large extent, been assuaged by personal contact between Mitchell and Trimble.

“Their attitude and position was also complicated by all too obvious concerns about being outflanked by Paisley and stirrings within their own party.

“Pulling in another direction, however, was Trimble’s evident huge enjoyment about being involved in negotiations which, I believe, contributed to a strong personal reluctance to walk away.

“The Alliance were in deepest gloom. They had been very depressed, though perhaps not surprised, by the procedural wrangling which had, so far, totally dominated events.”

Mr Howard said that the Irish government “acquiesced in the subordinate role they played” in the meetings, “though they evidently did not like it”.

He said that towards the end of the day “it became clear that if we were to keep the UUP in the process it would be necessary to address their concern about the procedural rules.” It was accepted that a deal which brought in the UUP would probably not be enough to retain the DUP and UKUP but the judgment of both governments and the independent chairmen was that in such circumstances the talks would remain viable.”

The following day the governments tabled proposals for amended procedures and the parties then entered bilateral negotiations with each other, the governments and the chairmen.

“After a huge row with the Irish government, the SDLP very reluctantly accepted that this was the best on offer. The DUP and the UKUP effectively rejected it ... in the end and as expected, it came down to trying to do a deal with the UUP.

“Their initial reaction to the paper was that it had some good elements in it but the order needed to be changed [appointing a committee first to finalise the rules before appointing a plenary chairman].

“However, the Secretary of State said he intended to press ahead with the proposal as it had been tabled.

“Trimble at that stage said that this was unacceptable. The Secretary of State said that ... in those circumstances [he] would have little option but to conclude that the talks were not viable [and] suspend them.

“A consequence of that, of course, would be that there would be no Forum. This evinced some horrified looks, particularly from Geoffrey [sic] Donaldson and a physical/mental gulp from Trimble who, nevertheless, said ‘So be it’.

“By 2pm, he said that the Secretary of State had concluded that it was ‘the end of the process’ and “we reported to the Prime Minister suggesting that the only card remaining was a direct call from him to Trimble.

“Events then took an extraordinary turn. Very shortly after his meeting with the Secretary of State, Trimble asked to see Senator Mitchell and at 2.30 presented a compromise proposal to the Secretary of State, saying that he would be prepared to accept Mitchell as chairman, provided that the interim rules under which he operated were not those of 6 June, but those which applied during the 1991/2 talks.

“The Secretary of State believed that this was a major concession and the next few hours were spent trying desperately to sell it to the Irish Government and the SDLP.

“For a while this showed signs of being fruitless with Hume effectively saying that he and his party had already moved enough in the direction of unionist concerns and would move no further; and the Irish showing an overwhelming and inexplicable solitude for the dignity of the three independent chairman [sic], effectively suggesting that it would be best for everyone if we were to cut our losses and move out of the process.”

However, he said that “then news filtered up about another almost unprecedented event in the shape of direct negotiations between Irish ministers (without Sean O’hUiginn) and David Trimble. (It later transpired that Trimble had tried for nearly three hours to see the Irish and only succeeded after a direct appeal to the Taoiseach’s office).”

He said that for several hours that left the British side “in the unaccustomed position of having to twiddle its thumbs while the Irish and the UUP tried to come to terms”.

That ended when the tanaiste appeared “clutching a piece of paper... representing an agreement between the Irish, the UUP and the SDLP”.

By now it was almost midnight and “Dr Paisley and his colleagues became increasingly loud and belligerent, at one time threatening to burst into the Secretary of State’s office”.

When informed that a deal had been done, there were “loud shouts of protests and Paisley, McCartney and their teams stormed out”.

Eventually, after midnight, Senator Mitchell took over as chairman and faced a barrage from Dr Paisley who then led the DUP out.

Martin Howard said: “In 20 months as a private secretary I have been privileged to be part of, or witness to, a number of extraordinary events, but I think the last two days has topped them all.

“More than once, the whole enterprise was on the point of failure and, in accordance with normal practice in Northern Irish political affairs, was only saved in the small hours of the morning ... most extraordinary of all was the fact that the final deal was done between the Irish government and David Trimble.”

He added: “Finally, the other great success has been leaving Sinn Fein literally, and metaphorically, out in the cold. Their attempt to gain entry into the talks on Monday failed to gain them the public confrontation which they had sought and their demonstrations on Tuesday and Wednesday attracted minimal media coverage.”