Belfast Agreement @25: A spirit of genuine partnership is now absent in the larger two parties, writes Brid Rodgers

Appeals from political leaders, church leaders and others to paramilitaries on all sides for an end to violence were ignored.

Historical divisions had been built on one hand by unionist fears of being forced into a united Ireland against their will, a fear induced by the rhetoric of their political leaders. This fear was copper fastened by the rhetoric from some nationalist representatives in the republic committing to regain ‘the fourth green field’ and reclaiming the ‘six counties’, a claim further underlined by intermittent violence from the IRA.

Nationalists on the other hand were subjected to widespread discrimination and condemned to be dominated by a unionist government with an artificially built in majority with no hope of having the power or influence to change their situation.

It is difficult for the generations that didn’t live through the 1970s, 80s and 90s to imagine what life for the people of Northern Ireland was like during ‘the Troubles’.

I hope I will be forgiven for reluctantly painting a picture with a few random examples from those decades during which 3,665 people, mostly civilians lost their lives.

The murder of six Catholics, the O’Dowds and Reaveys in their homes in January 1972, followed by the murders in retaliation of 10 Protestant workmen in Bessbrook on their way home from work the following evening; The horrific attack on the Pentecostal Church in Darkley in 1983 murdering three worshippers and later in 1994 a gun attack on a pub frequented by Catholics in Loughinisland killing six people; The Shankill bomb – 10 dead, nine of them Saturday morning shoppers; immediate retaliation in a Greysteel pub frequented by Catholics – eight dead including two Protestants;

Bloody Sunday, 13 dead; Bloody Friday; 9 dead. The list is endless.

Add to that the utter distrust within the nationalist community of a British government, the whitewashing of the British army’s responsibility for the massacre on Bloody Sunday and in Ballymurphy and the strong suspicion of police collusion in the murders of Catholics. A suspicion confirmed in recent years.

As atrocity followed atrocity the distrust and bitterness between the communities deepened.

It was against this horrendous background during which numerous attempts to negotiate an end to paramilitary violence had failed that an inclusive process of negotiation began. Finding agreement looked like an impossible ask.

Yet a number of things made it possible.

Firstly there was a desperate yearning for peace across all sections of the community.

Secondly the committed and courageous leadership of the main parties of nationalism and unionism, in particular it has to be said, of David Trimble who lacked the full support of his own party not to mention the vocal and total opposition from the sidelines by the DUP.

Thirdly the international support from America and Europe.

And so an agreement was reached and more importantly endorsed by referenda North and South. The 71% yes vote in Northern Ireland clearly included a significant number of unionists. Nevertheless the legacy of division and distrust would not disappear overnight nor would the hurt and wounds be easily healed.

The release of prisoners, Sinn Fein in government in the absence of IRA decommissioning, the removal of articles two and three laying claim to the area of the six northern counties from the Irish constitution were among the difficult compromises that 71% of the people of Northern Ireland had accepted perhaps with some apprehension but in the hope of a better and above all a peaceful future.

So what went wrong?

A combination of things. Loss of unionist support for the agreement mainly as a result of the seven year delay in IRA decommissioning. The consequent rise in support for the DUP leading to a change in the arrangements for electing the first and deputy first minister in the St Andrews Agreement. Ian Paisley’s reluctance to be seen to support Martin McGuinness as deputy allowed each party to propose and separately support their own nomination. It was the beginning of unravelling the spirit of respect, reconciliation and genuine partnership required for the difficult task of delivering on the promise of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA).

Has it been perfect? No. Has it failed? No.

It has transformed Northern Ireland and given us 25 years of relative peace. It has been been failed by the key parties at the helm for the last 15 years. It was reached by courageous leadership that put the need for compromise above the fear of compromise.

So what of the present stalemate?

The division between unionists and nationalists remains.

Tribal loyalties remain dominant. However the will to work in the spirit of the agreement in genuine partnership and mutual respect between the two larger parties is absent. Like it or not the DUP represents the majority of unionists as did David Trimble in 1998. It is agreed between all parties and both governments and clearly stated in the internationally binding GFA that there can be no change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority.

The opportunity still exists for political parties to work together dealing with the issues that matter to people in their everyday lives, the opportunity to transform lives bring investment and jobs, the opportunity to live in a society that respects and appreciates diversity. It is an opportunity to deliver on the promise and the hopes of the better future democratically mandated by the people of Ireland in the referenda of 1998. What is required now is the same commitment and courage of the political leaders of 1998 and crucially of David Trimble who was beleaguered from all sides by the naysayers.

They were prepared to take risks in the interest of peace and the common good. They put the need for compromise above the fear of compromise.

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• Brid Rodgers was deputy leader of the SDLP, MLA for Upper Bann and Stormont agriculture minister 1999 to 2002