Alex Kane: We are heading towards a very dark and dangerous place

The problem with an endgame position is that the game often remains unfinished: “the game was adjourned after 41 moves in a rook and pawn endgame.” But in politics, particularly in the shift from conflict to post-conflict, adjourning the game won’t and can’t resolve anything.

There is nothing certain in politics, but it seems to me that the evidence in favour of the determination to create a consensual, honest, cooperative power-sharing government in Northern Ireland is dwarfed by the mountain of evidence indicating the contrary. As far back as 2009, two years after the DUP and Sinn Fein reached agreement on working together in the Executive, I wrote a piece arguing that their arrangement was, in fact and in execution, based on a pretence. ‘How long,’ I wondered, ‘can this pretence be sustained? How long before we all realise that the pretence, based on avoiding the tough questions and difficult decisions, is doing enormous, long-lasting damage?’

That’s why I haven’t been surprised by the continuing impasse. In a wash-up analysis for the BBC on the Sunday lunchtime after the 2017 Assembly election I suggested that it was now ‘extraordinarily difficult’ to avoid the conclusion that re-establishing the Assembly/Executive was more pipedream than possibility. And even if the parties did reach some sort of deal, I argued that it was likely to be short-lived and built on quicksand. Almost 30 months later and I wouldn’t change a word of that commentary.

One thing that has changed, though, is the political mood music. Huge numbers of unionists who had been supportive – if not wildly enthused by power-sharing with Sinn Fein – have shifted their sights to either de facto or de jure direct rule. Meanwhile, huge numbers of nationalists have shifted their sight towards Irish unity rather than an internal settlement.

The relationship between unionism and the Irish government is worse than at any time since the Anglo-Irish Agreement period in the mid to late 1980s; while nationalism is clearly unsettled by what it regards as the rise of ‘little-Englander populism’. The gulf between unionism and nationalism is wider than at any time since the early 1970s; so bad is the relationship between both blocs that even the Alliance Party is viewed by a section of unionism (and it seems to be growing) as a new wing of a ‘pan-nationalist front’.

Some people, albeit mainly nationalists, the Irish government and a section of unionism point the finger of blame for this sea-change in relationships and political dynamics directly at Brexit. I acknowledge that Brexit upped the ante and provided an unexpectedly early ‘England’s problem is Ireland’s opportunity’ moment, but that moment was always coming. The relationships have been deteriorating since at least 2009, when it was increasingly obvious that the DUP and Sinn Fein were operating a version of ‘ourselves alone,’ using the Executive, the Petition of Concern and a never-ending series of crises to pursue separate agendas rather than a collective one.

It is stupid, utterly stupid, to imagine that had the 2016 referendum not produced a victory for Leave then all would now be well in Northern Ireland. It wouldn’t. The Irish language dispute wouldn’t have been resolved. The dispute over legacy would have continued. All the other unresolved issues would have remained unresolved. Sinn Fein would still be pushing for unity and a border poll. The RHI crisis would still have happened. The ‘feed a crocodile’ comment would still have been uttered. There would be no love-in between unionism and nationalism. We’d still be annoying the hell out of each other on a daily basis. The demographics would continue to shift in the same direction they have shifted for decades. Ironically, the only thing that might have been different is that Alliance wouldn’t now be sitting on 18%.

I also believe that both the spoken language and body language has changed, very markedly for the worse. I spend a lot of time talking to people at conferences and panel events and their attitude to those they blame for the impasse has become very aggressive. Ordinary people I meet at shops, restaurants, petrol stations and parks are just as bad. From about 1998 to 2005 there was a general consensus among pro-agreement voters that compromise was required from all sides. That’s gone. Both sides – even many people I view as being in the middle – are compromised out. They don’t think they’ve anything left to give. And, to be honest, I think most of them wouldn’t even give if they had something to give.

So, where does all of this leave us? At another endgame. Maybe not as epic as Avengers: Endgame, but epic nonetheless. It is now immaterial to me who blames whom for the failure, the fact remains that there is a collective failure to deliver devolution. A stable, cooperative, trusting-each-other government is not possible. Working together is not possible: and that will remain the case irrespective of whether we have pretend devolution, direct rule, or Irish unity. It will remain the case irrespective of what happens with Brexit.

Stability requires trust. That trust does not exist within our party-political classes and it doesn’t exist across voting blocs – the overwhelming majority of whom still vote for the us-and-them options. The narrower the gap between pro-Union and pro-unity votes (and I’m measuring that by the share of votes between unionist and nationalist parties and, for the sake of argument, splitting Alliance 50/50) the wider the cooperation/trust gap between both blocs.

My view – and I don’t say this easily or lightly – is that we are heading towards a very dark, very dangerous place, with no sign whatsoever that politicians, let alone the general public, have any idea just how bad it could become. More worryingly, I’m not convinced we can do anything to avoid that awful destination.