Brexit upended things but I still don't expect Irish unity

The question I’m asked most often — and have been since the Brexit referendum result in 2016: Do you think there’ll be a united Ireland in your lifetime?

My lifetime will probably end in the next 20 years, taking me up to 2038 (although given my fondness for Custard Creams and an Ulster Fry I could keel over anytime); but my answer to the question is always No. Of course, I’m not going to speculate on what happens after I’m pushing up the daisies but, as it stands — even with the shift in demographs and the fallout from Brexit — I don’t believe a majority in Northern Ireland will vote to leave the United Kingdom anytime soon.

Until the Brexit result I’m pretty sure most nationalists/republicans didn’t believe there’d be a united Ireland anytime soon, either. The issue wasn’t taken seriously in Dublin, even in sotto voce conversations. Yes, there was an acknowledgment that it was possible at some point in the future; but given the Troubles (causes and consequences) was still a ‘live’ issue and the fact that many ‘big ticket’ problems remain unsolved 20 years after the GFA, there was certainly no particular desire in the southern political establishment to rush, let alone push gently, the unity issue.

Both London and Dublin — as co-guarantors of the GFA - remain focused on shoring-up good relations between north and south and underpinning the best relationship between London and Dublin there has been in almost a century. And while Sinn Fein talked the talk about the ‘unity project’ they knew that fulfilment of that goal was a long way off; so settled for non-stop campaigns and issue-focusing which allowed them to argue that ‘progress’ to eventual unity was ongoing. Meanwhile, in overall electoral terms, the evidence suggested that the republican/nationalist vote was mostly treading water.

Brexit has upended the dynamics: between north and south, between London and Dublin and, crucially, between unionism and nationalism here. It has raised questions about ‘identity,’ particularly for those who were reasonably content to remain within the UK (albeit within the EU) even though they had no fondness for ‘local’ unionism and the DUP. It has forced Ireland to ask very difficult questions about its relationship with the UK post-Brexit, as well as equally difficult questions about the relationship between north and south.

So it’s no surprise that Irish unity is being discussed. And it’s no surprise that Sinn Fein has seized an opportunity that it hadn’t predicted would present itself. There has never been a moment in the history of modern Sinn Fein (which I date from 1969/70) when so many people and parties, north and south, have been talking about unity. The use of the softer ‘new Ireland’ is pitched as much at Dublin as it is at small-n nationalists and small-u unionists on this side of the border (many of whom can’t stand Arlene Foster). The south has changed enormously in the past 30 years and Sinn Fein is keen to compare/contrast that ‘new’ Ireland with what they regard as the ‘backward’ north. Put bluntly, Sinn Fein believes there has never been a better time to maximize the vote for unity, which explains the present push for a border poll and the relentless campaigning.

The problem, of course, is that Dublin will be much more cautious. They much prefer the slow, steady, measured approach to unity (in other words, they’re prepared to wait and wait) and certainly don’t want to have to build a new state anytime soon. As I’ve pointed out a few times in the last 18 months the process of NI leaving the UK and then folding it into a united Ireland will be an enormously complicated one. I’ve also mentioned many times that key questions haven’t even been asked yet. No amount of campaigning from Sinn Fein on unity will counterbalance the continuing absence of serious, detailed, thought-through input to the debate from an Irish government. And while Sinn Fein may talk about their presence in a future coalition being dependent on movement on the ‘national question,’ they will know that unity isn’t that simple.

While I acknowledge that there are people in Northern Ireland now thinking about unity, who would never have thought about it before, I don’t think it follows that unity is any nearer. As I say, any debate requires serious input from London and Dublin and it also requires solid answers to difficult questions. There is no evidence of that. It requires serious debate south of the border and there is little evidence of that. Recent opinion polls — and I don’t question the fact that they reflect the answers they are given — are not a reliable guide at the moment, because none of us know the shape, nature and consequences of the choices we’d have before us during a border poll debate. I will make one point, though: it doesn’t make sense to me that with 40% or so presently voting for pro-united Ireland parties, only 21 or 22 percent would vote for unity in a border poll.

Everything could change, of course, if the final deal for leaving the EU is regarded as a hard, bad one. Yet my instincts have remained that London/Dublin/Brussels know that it is in their collective interests to deliver a good deal: the sort of deal that doesn’t raise next-generation problems between north and south. A good deal is bad for the prospects of Irish unity in the near future. Even a bad deal doesn’t make unity a necessarily easier prospect. And therein lies the real problem for Sinn Fein. If they can’t manipulate the present circumstances in favour of unity sooner rather than much later, then it’s very unlikely that a better opportunity will present itself anytime soon./