Alex Kane: Appeasement of Sinn Fein had nothing to do with rights

One tweeted: ‘Did he actually use the term serial appeasement in relation to the reforms needed to level the playing field and bring about equality of citizenship for native Irish Catholics in the 6 counties?’ Another accused me of being ‘angry at nationalism’. But I have never had an issue with reform and equality of citizenship, which is why I supported Brian Faulkner and power-sharing in 1973/4. It’s why I supported David Trimble and the Belfast Agreement in 1998. It’s why I don’t, as one respondent seemed to suggest, describe rights as appeasements. It’s why I’m not ‘angry’ at, or with nationalism.

I have previously acknowledged the important and necessary work done by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and SDLP in trying to fashion political/societal institutions in which we could all have a sense of ownership; and while I accepted that the aspirations for a united Ireland would never disappear, I did argue (and certainly hoped) that genuine equality of citizenship would help to dampen those aspirations and build a Northern Ireland which would have the support of a cross-community majority.

That Sinn Fein continues to prioritise unity over every option is no surprise to me. Indeed, my opening line last week was, ‘Sinn Fein is doing what Sinn Fein has always done; playing its own cards in its own time.’ Later, I noted: ‘While politics is now the preferred way of doing business, the willingness to dump policies and strategies (including a terror campaign from 1970 to 1997) has always been there. It was a long journey – with Gerry Adams as the guiding strategist for most of the time – but the shift from outright terror; to ballot box and armalite; to fighting elections and taking seats; to peace talks; to the ceasefires and ending of the ‘armed struggle’; to co-governing with unionists in Stormont; to serving as deputy with a unionist first minister; to shaking hands with the Queen et al; has all been part of the same ‘unity project’.’

But my use of ‘appeasement’ had nothing to do with rights, or reform, or equality of citizenship, or building a cohesive Northern Ireland. I used it – and very specifically so – in reference to Sinn Fein and the IRA and certain things that happened during the ‘long journey’ I mentioned above. No other nationalist party was mentioned in the column. No condemnation of rights or reforms was mentioned. This was about issues which I viewed as being asked for by and then delivered for Sinn Fein; and for Sinn Fein alone. Anyway, I was asked for ‘three or four examples of this serial appeasement since the early 1970s’.

In July 1972 the British government opened its first formal back-channel links with the Provisional IRA (including bringing Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness to a meeting in London) and began what became a decades-long dialogue on what was required from the government for the IRA to end its terror campaign. Those back-channels were never closed, leaving the very clear impression within both Sinn Fein and the IRA that eventual deals were possible even while the terror campaign continued. Crucially, the assumption, on both sides, must have been that any deal would be broadly acceptable to the joint leadership of SF and the IRA.

In 1981 the introduction of the ballot box/armalite strategy was the clearest possible signal that the IRA intended to continue the terror campaign while Sinn Fein increasingly tested the electoral waters. That should have been enough for any British government to close down the back-channels and insist that, in the absence of an unambiguous shift to democracy only, then all links between SF/IRA, the government and the intelligence services would end; with the government prioritising a military response. But again the impression was conveyed that keeping Sinn Fein on board was more important to the government than any other option.

In February 1996 the IRA ended its ceasefire with a massive bomb in the Docklands in London. In July 1997 the ceasefire was reinstated and Sinn Fein was given the green light by Tony Blair to return to the talks process without any commitment on the decommissioning issue. The other parties in the process were, to all intents and purposes, presented with a fait accompli: accept Sinn Fein’s return or see the entire process collapse. Keeping Sinn Fein on board was, yet again, deemed more important than anything else.

On-the-run letters were given the OK by the government because it was an issue of importance to Sinn Fein alone.

In 2015 it was confirmed that the Army Council was still in existence and continuing an overarching input into Sinn Fein, the political structures north and south and the IRA itself. Despite concerns from the other parties the issue was brushed off by the government.

I would define all of these as appeasements because they were done to keep Sinn Fein and the IRA within the process, irrespective of the anger and impact of and within the other parties. Others would add the early release of prisoners to the list, but I viewed that as more a concession to all of the paramilitaries, aimed at securing a collective buy-in to a peace process and agreement. A number of other decisions made during the run-up to the 1998 agreement, while uncomfortable for key players (and broader voting bases) on both sides, could also be regarded as collective concessions.

The other point I made in last week’s column was that what I’m defining as appeasements (and I think most unionists would describe them as such) raises serious, difficult and ongoing questions about how successive British governments viewed and continue to view Sinn Fein. As one veteran unionist put it to me last week: “Nothing changes. What Sinn Fein wants Sinn Fein gets. To be honest, you can’t really blame them for their never-ending demands – it’s a policy that seems to work for them.”