Esmond Birnie: Confidence about the affordability of a united Ireland is flawed as fiscal subvention from the UK grows
Last month the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published the latest figures about Northern Ireland’s net fiscal balance: the extent to which the UK government puts extra money into Northern Ireland (NI) beyond the taxes raised here.


That regional fiscal deficit had been extremely large in 2020-21: £17.5bn. As the regional economy and society recovered from Covid the deficit fell to £13.85bn in 2021-22 but then increased to £14.2bn in 2022-23.
The subvention increased by about £400m in cash terms in 2022-23 compared to the previous year. This confirms something that I wrote last year, that Covid was going to have long lasting effects on the extent to which NI was dependent on the UK Exchequer.
Even when we allow for inflation and estimate the scale of the subvention in real terms, any return back to the pre-Covid (i.e. pre 2020-21 levels) has been very slow.
History repeats itself and each economic crisis leads public expenditure to ratchet upwards.
The 2007-8 banking crisis and subsequent 2009-10 world recession caused a big jump in NI’s subvention.
Over the following decade there was only a very slow and partial reduction in that subvention. Covid led to another peak in 2020-21.
Levels are likely to remain stubbornly high for years to come. This is before we have data for 2023-24 and subsequent years which will show the impact of the £3.3bn package which accompanied restoration of devolution at the start of this year.
At one level measurement of the net fiscal balance/subvention looks like boring bean counting. In truth, measurement of the subvention relies on some tricky concepts.
What is the level of government spending not just inside NI but also at the UK-wide level (e.g. interest payments on national debt, payments to international bodies and cost of defence spending) which might in part be apportioned to NI because it benefits NI?
Similarly, the measurement of NI-related tax revenue is not just taxes actually collected from within NI but, sometimes, NI’s share of UK-level sources of revenue, e.g. a proportional share of North Sea oil and gas revenue.
The implications of the subvention figures could be large.
Firsts of all, they might imply something about whether Stormont has worked effectively.
To an extent it is almost inevitable that the relatively poor region NI (GDP per person levels below the UK average) has a subvention: given that public spending will be higher than the UK average and taxes collected lower.
But this cannot explain why the level of subvention per person is considerably higher than that in the two other UK regions most similar to NI in terms of levels of GDP per person: Wales and North East England.
In 2022-23 the NI subvention per person was £7433 but that in Wales was £6749 and in the North East £6255.
Something extra is going on in NI which makes our subvention higher. Could this be another legacy effect of the Troubles - but is that really a viable explanation a quarter of a century on from 1998?
More plausible is the argument that the existence of such a large transfer payment into NI distorts and harms decision making on the part of our private and public sectors.
It is significant that the NI political parties are as one in a plea for “fair funding” from London. They mean more funding.
There is evidence that in the most recent years funding for public spending in NI per person compared to England has fallen below the level implied by as estimate of relative need in NI.
That said there is also a lot of evidence that for most of the 1980s through to the late 2010s NI was generously funded above need but this did not necessarily filter through into delivery of higher quality services.
Notwithstanding that funding advantage when Stormont was operating during that period it did not perform brilliantly compared to government in the rest of the UK.
In any case, increase in the UK government funding for NI would imply an even bigger subvention.
There is much less emphasis amongst the politicians on either revenue raising at the regional level or extracting greater value for money from the spending we already have.
I would like to believe that some forthcoming and major decisions about use of public funds in NI such as a loan guarantee for Harland and Wolff and subsidy for Casement Park will satisfy all the normal rules to protect value for money, but I am not confident.
A big subvention and a big state give a sometimes harmful logic to decision making. Instead of being based on rates of return, investment decisions are liable to be politicised in the worst sense.
As to a second possible wider significance of NI’s massive and stubbornly high subvention figure, it is claimed that the ONS subvention figure tells us nothing about how much a united Ireland would cost the Republic of Ireland’s Exchequer.
This point has been made repeatedly since 2021 by the Dublin Professor John Doyle, receiving much coverage in the NI media, particularly the BBC and Belfast Telegraph.
Doyle has claimed that the “day one” united Ireland required fiscal transfer from Dublin to Belfast would be only about £3bn.
This estimate was based on figures for 2018-19 allied to the assumptions he made that the UK government would retain a liability to pay for state pensions in NI, that there would be no transfer of a proportion of UK public debt to the united Ireland and that the post-unity the Dublin government would avoid a substantial increase in defence spending.
As I have argued elsewhere (Why the Subvention does matter), all those assumptions are debatable.
Doyle’s confidence about the affordability of a united Ireland is flawed in that he is using “old data” (2018-19) and, secondly, has not allowed for the long lasting impact of Covid in 2020-21 on NI public finances.
The latest ONS data regarding the subvention confirm just how large and persistent that effect has been.
Dr Esmond Birnie is senior economist at Ulster University Business School