Gordon Lucy: James II lacked authority even before siege of Derry started

As far as Louis XIV of France was concerned, James’ primary role (and perhaps only role) was to divert William’s attention from the war in continental Europe. Louis had comparatively little interest in assisting James to regain his English or Scottish thrones. D’Avaux closely adhered to the view of his Royal master at Versailles.

There was also less than a perfect meeting of minds between James and his Roman Catholic Irish subjects, as represented by the Duke of Tyrconnell.

Irish Roman Catholics believed that James II was weak and too subservient to English interests.

The priority they accorded to the summoning of the ‘Patriot Parliament’ with its agenda of repealing the land settlement and anti-Catholic laws and measures to reduce Ireland’s dependency on England underscores the point.

Charles O’Kelly, an Irish Jacobite, thought that James was ‘as little disposed as his brother [Charles II] … to assert the hereditary rights of the natives, or restore their estates’. D’Avaux thought James had ‘a heart too English to do anything that might vex the English’. Objectively, he had done more than enough to vex them already.

So, like the French, the Irish had only limited interest in the restoration of James to his English or Scottish thrones,

From James’ perspective, his clear priority was to bring Protestant resistance at Enniskillen and Londonderry to an end. The only significant person in James’ entourage to share fully this view was John Drummond, Earl of Melfort, who James had appointed secretary of state for Ireland. Melfort encouraged James to disregard Irish demands and prioritise transferring his forces to Scotland and rendezvousing with the Jacobite forces under the command of Viscount Dundee (‘Bonnie Dundee’). This made him extremely unpopular with both the French and the Irish.

James was effectively a pawn in other people’s games and was the recipient of conflicting advice – so much so that he literally knew neither whether he was coming or going. This made for neither happiness nor effectiveness. Not being familiar with the stroppiness and lack of deference of the city predominantly Ulster-Scots rank-and-file defenders who did not subscribe to ‘the divine right of kings’ and ‘passive resistance’, James wished to go to Derry seek admission to the city. D'Avaux advised against but James insisted on travelling as far as Omagh before agreeing to return to Dublin.

On April 10 Lieutenant-Colonel Lundy, the commander of the Londonderry garrison, presided over a council of war and was appointed commander-in-chief in the field despite the reservations of some about his loyalty.

On April 15 1689 Richard Hamilton, the Jacobite commander and victor of ‘the break of Dromore’, forced a crossing of the Finn river at Clady and Rosen, a Baltic-German major general in French service, did likewise at Lifford where the Finn and the Mourne converge to become the Foyle.

Both George Walker and John Mackenzie in their otherwise conflicting accounts of the siege concur in blaming Lundy for the failure of Protestant forces to halt the Jacobites at the river crossings.

However, it is only fair to observe that the Protestant forces at Clady and at Lifford did not distinguish themselves. A hastily assembled collection of amateurs devoid of military experience or expertise, they offered negligible resistance.

On April 14 English ships appeared in the Foyle with reinforcements for Lundy under Colonel Cunningham. Lundy persuaded Cunningham that there were not enough provisions within the city, that the city was impossible to defend, and that troops should not disembark.

Lundy’s pessimistic assessment was by no means wholly unrealistic or irrational. The city’s 70-year-old walls had been constructed to protect the plantation from the native Irish. They did not measure up to contemporary European standards with which he would have been familiar.

If the Jacobites had possessed heavy artillery, proper siege guns could have reduced the walls to rubble within hours. Furthermore, there was the serious problem of feeding an inflated population of 30,000.

Negotiations took place between a delegation from the city, including the Church of Ireland archdeacon of Raphoe, and Hamilton and Rosen to ascertain what terms the Jacobites would offer in return for the city’s surrender.

Their reply was that the citizens would be allowed to live in peace, provided they handed over any horses and weapons which were suitable for military purposes.

Londonderry was given until midday the next day to consider and the Jacobite army undertook not to come within four miles of the city.

The Duke of Berwick advised his father, who on his way back to Dublin had reached Charlemont, to turn back which he did. James, ignorant of the arrangement between his commanders and the city, was persuaded by Berwick that if he appeared before the walls the inhabitants would acknowledge him as their legitimate monarch.

James and Rosen rode up to the walls with part of his army and flying colours. As this was a breach of the terms between the Jacobite commanders and the city, James was met with ‘a discharge of musketry and cannon from the troops stationed in the church bastion’ and ‘the triumphant shout of “No Surrender”’. One of James’s aides-de-camp was killed at his side.

Disconcerted by the defiance of his Ulster-Scots subjects, James beat a hasty retreat but made a further attempt to persuade them to surrender by offering them a free pardon, an offer which cut no ice with them.

The Apprentice Boys of Derry annually commemorate the shutting of the gates by the 13 apprentices in December 1688, the precise significance of which is debatable, but this dramatic event did not mark the beginning of the siege.

The 105-day-long siege began with James being refused entry to the city on April 18 1689. Yet, curiously the Apprentice Boys of Derry choose not to commemorate this at least as dramatic episode and wholly unambiguous repudiation of James II’s authority.