Sam McBride: toppling Stormont was easy; not so its return

The moment a gaunt '“ and we now know, dying '“ Martin McGuinness announced a year ago that he was collapsing devolution in Northern Ireland, it was clear that the decision represented a fundamental shift in the strategy which Sinn Fein had adopted since the IRA gave up its weapons.
Martin McGuinness being driven away from Stormont on the night he resigned a year agoMartin McGuinness being driven away from Stormont on the night he resigned a year ago
Martin McGuinness being driven away from Stormont on the night he resigned a year ago

The essence of what was happening was summed up in one sentence from the man who along with Gerry Adams had personified the IRA and then Sinn Fein for half a century. Even though it was delivered with a weak voice, the words were clear: “There will be no return to the status quo except on terms that are acceptable to Sinn Fein.”

A year on, there has been no return to what went before and the prospects for any return to Stormont appear to be receding with each week that passes.

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Sinn Fein has flexed its muscles, making clear that republicans can veto devolution for Northern Ireland and ultimately – if this goes on for years – almost certainly topple the DUP leader, Arlene Foster. There was a time when republicanism could only have dreamt of being in such a position.

But while self-confidence oozed through nationalism in the wake of Mr McGuinness’ resignation and then Sinn Fein’s stunning Assembly election result where it came just one seat behind the DUP, is the ‘no return to the status quo’ soundbite a long-term strategy for Sinn Fein if the DUP is not prepared to concede enough of its demands?

Every action by nationalism prompts a correlating reaction from unionism – as is true in reverse. Unionism not only responded to Sinn Fein’s new strategy by returning to the DUP in large numbers in the general election, but then hardened its position as it saw the unprecedented clout which the DUP commanded at Westminster.

The result of two large, confident blocs, each democratically mandated to stand firm rather than to compromise, has been stalemate.

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Rather than the public pressurising the parties to return to Stormont, DUP and Sinn Fein voters – who know that will mean a compromise – are in many cases actively arguing against such a deal.

The result has been that after supposedly toppling Stormont over the ‘cash for ash’ scandal, Sinn Fein has precipitated an unintended situation in which Northern Ireland is now being run with no democratic accountability by many of the civil servants whose multiple errors in designing that scheme are now being exposed in excruciating detail by the RHI inquiry.

Alongside that situation, Sinn Fein has quietly dropped what this time last year was its one ‘red line’ for re-entering government: that Arlene Foster could not be first minister while the inquiry was ongoing.

Speaking on RTE yesterday, Sinn Fein’s leader-in-waiting, Mary Lou McDonald, claimed that the party did not have “red lines of our creation”, but wanted to see the implementation of multi-lateral agreements between it, the DUP and the two governments – an allusion to issues such as an Irish language act.

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That again implicitly appeared to abandon the demand for Mrs Foster to step aside and logically would also cast adrift the demand for same-sex marriage, something which has widespread support in Northern Ireland but was never part of an agreement, before power-sharing can return.

For the DUP’s part, months ago the party’s centre of power shifted from Stormont to Westminster where its MPs are increasingly public about their bullishness. Many of their supporters welcome the prospect of direct rule by a Tory government sustained in office by the DUP.

Tearing Stormont down was satisfying for republicanism and relatively easy. Building it back up will be more difficult and less exhilarating work.

The post-1998 Stormont has had compromise at its heart and if it returns it will be as a result of give and take by each side. The parties may be closer to accepting that than would appear to be the case in public. But the voters who put them where they are appear to prefer a protracted period of drift, even if that means bad government, rather than conceding the other side’s demands.