Alex Kane: Anger must not be the only response to threat to Union

Everything Sinn Fein does, every move it makes, every policy and strategy it adopts, is shaped and steered by any potential contribution it might make to Irish unity rather than consensus in NI. Which means that every event, every circumstance, is drilled into and explored for the opportunities it provides to pursue and deliver unity. If that means overturning previous policies and dumping once-cherished strategies, then so be it.

A classic example was the abandoning of 40 years of opposition to membership of the EEC/EC/EU in the 2016 Brexit referendum. Until that point Sinn Fein had been consistent opponents of membership: but the likelihood of being on the wrong side of the electoral maths in Northern Ireland, on the wrong side of broad opinion in the Republic, and on the same side as the DUP and right-wing populism in England, saw the party execute a neat little triple-jump into the pro-Remain camp.

And, of course, it played out rather nicely for the party, providing it with an unexpected ‘England’s misfortune is Ireland’s opportunity’ card to play at a time when a usually fairly sanguine element of nationalism and an element of small-u unionism (both elements had backed Remain) were rattled by the assorted consequences of the Leave victory.

No surprise, then, that the ‘unity project’ has, for the last four years, predominated and eclipsed everything else; with Brexit, RHI, closing down the Assembly and now Covid-19 providing opportunities (three of them unexpected, as it happens) to prioritise the agenda. The party’s similarly unexpected success in the last Irish election was another massive fillip.

While politics is now the preferred way of doing business, the willingness to dump policies and strategies (including a terror campaign from 1970 to 1997) has always been there. It was a long journey – with Gerry Adams as the guiding strategist for most of the time – but the shift from outright terror; to ballot box and armalite; to fighting elections and taking seats; to peace talks; to the ceasefires and ending of the ‘armed struggle’; to co-governing with unionists in Stormont; to serving as deputy with a unionist first minister; to shaking hands with the Queen et al; has all been part of the same ‘unity project’.

A few days ago, responding to the quashing of Gerry Adams’ convictions, the UUP’s Doug Beattie wrote: ‘It is time our government stopped appeasing the men and women who promoted violence and who have supported or engaged in the murder of our citizens throughout the UK. If a change in policy is not forthcoming, we are in very real danger of allowing a false narrative to be accepted, in which those who promoted and justified terrorism are rehabilitated as the good guys, whilst those who stood between the terrorists and the terrorised are portrayed as the villains of the piece.’

Claims that Sinn Fein and the IRA have been and continue to be ‘appeased’ are now commonplace across unionism. The claims are also, for the most part, accurate. Which raises a very serious problem for unionists in particular, because the appeasement seems to have been a central plank of UK policy since the early 1970s. I can understand the anger of unionists to this appeasement (especially those who took huge personal and political risks to build support for the Good Friday Agreement), but they need to focus on the fact that the appeasement has, generally speaking, been from Number 10, the NIO and successive governments.

When Doug writes, ‘if a change of policy is not forthcoming’, I think he would probably acknowledge that the policy change must come from London first and foremost. So, along with many other unionists, he needs to ask why there is a groundswell belief within unionism that Sinn Fein seems to be the sole beneficiary of a very specific policy; namely, if it needs appeased, then it will be appeased. More important, the party is always damn sure it will be appeased.

Which, in turn, raises some much more difficult questions for unionism: what is British policy towards Sinn Fein; what was/is British policy towards the IRA; what is the end goal of British policy re Northern Ireland; how crucial a role do the beliefs and values of unionists in Northern Ireland play in formulating British policy; how far would a British government go in the promotion and protection of Northern Ireland’s position within the Union (bearing in mind that Boris Johnson is a difficult man to trust at the best of times)?

Fine, get angry with the IRA. Get angry with Sinn Fein. Get angry with Gerry Adams. Get angry with a policy of serial appeasement from Number 10. Get angry with pressure coming from Dublin. Get angry with court rulings. But don’t allow that anger to become the be all and end all of unionist response. Instead, come up with a way of ending or diluting that appeasement. Ironically, the greatest potential threat to the Union at the moment is from Boris Johnson and yet there’s barely a squeak of protest about his latest wretched abandoning of pledges and commitments (not to mention his epic shafting of the DUP a few months ago).

What is lacking in unionism – and has been for a very long time (indeed I was writing about it in the News Letter at least 30 years ago) – is a crafted, coherent narrative to counter the narrative which Sinn Fein and their sympathisers have been promoting as a key aspect of their permanent project, along, latterly, with their post-ceasefire reinvention: a narrative that encompasses unionism’s history, identity, values, and collective priorities, as well as the history and activities of the IRA and Sinn Fein.

Putting it bluntly: there’s not much point in complaining about someone’s narrative when you aren’t constantly gathering, promoting and updating your own.